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Post-Keynesian, heterodox and Marxist political economists have rightly argued that the Euro-
zone crisis is not a fiscal crisis but a balance of payments crisis, mainly caused by the pivotal 
position of Germany in the EMU and its neo-mercantilist model of growth (low-wage, low-
inflation and export-led). This view, however, sees the split between core and periphery in the 
EU as something created with the introduction of the EMU in 1999. This paper contends that 
this is not the case. By putting forth a global fault-lines historical perspective and focusing on 
the case of Greece, it is argued that the problem is not the introduction of the EMU but the 
geo-political and macroeconomic asymmetries between core and periphery in Europe since 
the inception of what vaguely -- and even inaccurately -- can be defined as "European 
modernity". Global fault-lines offer a macro-historical and macro-economic understanding of 
crises seen as structural events generated by the evolving and contradictory tendencies of 
capitalism as a world system. It is not just a political economy perspective but a perspective 
that encompasses many instances of the social, especially geo-political and geo-cultural, 
structures 
 
Introduction 
In February 1947, and in front of a group of prominent senators and General George Marshall 
himself, Undersecretary of State, Dean Acheson gave a passionate speech explaining why the 
United States must intervene in Greece, which was at the time ravaged by a bloody Civil War 
between Communist and nationalist forces: 
If Greece fell like apples in a barrel infected by one rotten one, the corruption of 
Greece would infect Iran and all to the East. It would also carry infection to Africa 
through Asia Minor and Egypt, and to Europe through Italy and France, already 
threatened by the strongest Communist parties (Chase 1999, 166). 
Acheson's unusual call opened the way for the Marshall Plan for the reconstruction of Europe. 
Greece was Acheson's template of European crisis and fixing Greece meant fixing Europe.  
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 For more than five years, Greece and Europe have been bleeding. As in 1947, Greece 
is worst of all. The country's GDP has contracted by 25%, unemployment shot up to 30%, and 
youth unemployment is currently around 60% (Fouskas & Dimoulas 2013). Class polarisation 
is visible and the political system born after the fall of the Colonels in 1974 has effectively 
collapsed. In October 2011, then Greek Socialist PM, George Papandreou, made an unusual 
international call for help and threatened to put into a referendum the country's membership 
of the EU. Yet no analogous plea since Acheson was made by an American official or any other 
ally. There was no America to help and there was no Marshall Aid, only IMF and ECB loans 
with usurious interest rates. So, what happened? Has Europe or Greece lost their significance 
for the United States? The answer cannot be positive. America needs Europe today more than 
ever, especially vis-á-vis the Ukrainian and Middle Eastern contingencies. But, then, what is 
the problem? I argue that the United States today is no longer the credit power it was in the 
1940s and 1950s and that there is a slow and protracted, yet visible and pronounced power-
shift to China and other emerging capitalist economies. This relative decline of Euro-Atlantic 
economies is the result of neo-liberal financialisation that those economies have pursued 
since the 1970s in order to reverse the over-accumulation crisis of the time. Herein lies the 
main reason why there is no Marshall Plan on the table today not just for Europe but for tiny 
Greece.  
 This contribution identifies two problematic arguments about the origins of the Greek 
crisis. It also identifies one good argument that needs, nevertheless, some important 
qualifications. The first problematic argument comes from the creditor powers and their 
intellectuals, arguing that the crisis is fiscal (Pagoulatos & Triantopoulos 2010, Darvas et al.: 
2011). Roughly speaking, this means that the propensity of European states to spend over-
exceeds their capacity and ability to collect revenues. This is the so-called "state profligacy" 
argument that puts the blame squarely on domestic factors and, by and large, the people. 
The second argument with which this contribution has serious problems is that this is a crisis 
of EU Treaties and the Euro as a form of world money, and that if we fix the Treaties and the 
acquis, then the problem will be solved (Arestis & Sawyer: 2010). Finally, there is a third group 
of scholars and practitioners who have posed the most germane argument. In the words of 
Martin Wolf, Chief Economics Commentator of the Financial Times and celebrated financial 
journalist, "this is a typical balance of payments cum financial crisis and the fact that Greece 
was the first into trouble gave weight to the view that the crisis was fiscal" (Wolf 2013; 
Lapavitsas 2010; Stockhammer 2013; Lapavitsas 2013).  
 However, none of these arguments, including the third one, focus on the historical 
and geo-political origins of the Greek crisis identifying the agencies/actors behind it. And none 
of the arguments presented above places the crisis in a truly global context. I argue that the 
present crisis is a symptom of a wider, global systemic crisis bound up with the crisis of neo-
liberal financialization and a slow and protracted, yet steady and observable, power-shift to 
Asia and other emerging capitalist economies. These are processes that necessitate a "global 
fault-lines" approach. "Global fault-lines" is a novel, holistic framework of analysis in 
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international relations and political economy that encompasses all analytical instances of the 
social in a macro-historical and macro-political manner. Instead of breaking-up the 
Hegelian/Marxist totality into various epistemic instances designating "causes" and "effects", 
it accepts the relative autonomy of those instances from each other as co-constitutive 
variables of the totality, without determination "in the last analysis" (Fouskas and Gökay 
2012).  
I will thus first look into the issue of the "power-shift" to Asia from a global fault-lines 
perspective. Then I will concentrate on the Greek debt crisis as such by way of combining 
historical and contemporary perspectives, thus viewing it as a symptom of those global 
structural forces and shifts. We will come to realise that peripheral social formations such as 
Greece, as well as their economic and political crises, are best analysed and understood by 
connecting the instances of political economy and geo-politics; in other words, a global fault-
lines approach is rather necessary.  
 
Crisis in the Euro-Atlantic Core and the Power-Shift to Asia 
The provenance of the financial crisis which hit the Anglo-Saxon economies in summer 2007 
can be traced back to the 1970s. This was the decade of two oil-shocks, stagflation and 
collapse of profitability in the real economic sector and, fundamentally, President Nixon's 
decision to get rid of the Gold fetter (Gowan 1999, Brenner: 2003). The end of the Gold-Dollar 
parity and of fixed exchange rates unleashed financialisation in historically unprecedented 
ways (Glyn 2007, Aglietta 2008; Fine 2010; Duncan 2012): unlimited credit?? expansion and 
financial flows, accompanied by massive growth in the volume of global trade and FDI, 
including portfolio investment, asset management activity, mergers and acquisitions and 
extreme speculation in currency and derivatives markets. Oil trade has been peculiarly 
dollarised (Fouskas & Gökay 2005). What is hiding behind the term "globalisation" is a process 
of extreme financialisation, that is, activity of unfettered and uncommitted capital, capital 
which is not conducive to real commodity production (Fouskas & Dimoulas 2012, Epstein 
2013). It is uncommitted??, "fictitious" capital. In the indebted West today, the real economic 
sector has receded, giving way to fictitious capital activity, speculative arbitrage, services and 
consumption all of which are prone to boom and bust cycles, consumer indebtedness and 
extreme volatility and risk. Financial capital and generalised indebtedness have permeated 
the daily life of Western citizenship  
The second massive transformation of social and political relations, the sister-tendency of 
financialisation, goes under the name of neo-liberalism. This term, primarily, applies to the 
domestic environment of the state. For some, overcoming stagflation and the fiscal crisis of 
the state in the 1970s entailed the following: the welfare state must be retrenched; labour 
markets, banks and finance should be deregulated and state enterprises should be privatised. 
By "deregulation" is meant moving those agencies from state to private ownership and, in the 
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case of labour unions, freeing them from state protection. This did not mean end of state 
interference, inasmuch as the neo-liberal state has moved to "regulation via legislation" 
(Sassoon 1996). Neo-liberal regimes of financial accumulation are almost entirely based on a 
set of complex regulations advanced by the legislative branch of the bourgeois state 
(Lapavitsas 2013). In this context, by the early 1980s, state elites, whether on the Left or the 
Right, abandoned Keynesianism, giving way to supply-side economics. 
 Essentially, neo-liberalism and financialisation were the responses of the West to the 
profitability crisis in the 1970s. Yet the failure of this strategy to restore profitability and 
growth rates has been spectacular; in addition, it has failed to arrest the slow and protracted 
decline of the Western core as a whole. This slow decline of the core goes hand in glove with 
the complex -- and debatable for some scholars -- ascendance of China and other emerging 
economies, especially after the end of the Cold War. China dominates the world market in 
rare earth elements (a class of minerals that are essential for electronics and computers) and 
has become the second largest economy in the world -- it overtook Japan in February 2011. 
China has become the engine driving the recovery of other Asian economies from the 
recessions of the 1990s. In September 2013, the British Chancellor of the Exchequer, George 
Osborne, rolled out the red carpet for Chinese banks looking to expand in London, making the 
City a significant Chinese offshore banking centre. China has already captured a large share 
of Africa's oil and minerals market and dominates the textiles industry in Latin America. China 
and India produce a combined total of more than half a million engineering and science 
graduates per year. The respective numbers for the USA is 60,000. Although financialised and 
integrated into a global economy in which the dollar remains the key reserve currency, the 
real economic output of the so-called BRICs is healthy and their debt levels very low (Fouskas 
and Dimoulas 2013, 136).  
Financialisation increased the global debt in the time span of a decade (2002-2012) in every 
country except China, India, Brazil, Russia and South Africa. But where do Europe and Greece 
figure in all this? 
 During the "Golden Age of Capitalism" of the 1950s and 1960s (Hobsbawm 1995), 
Germany re-asserted itself as Europe's economic powerhouse. As Robert Brenner and other 
have argued, it was mainly competition from German and Japanese capitals that drove the 
downward spiral of the rate of profit in the Anglo-Saxon world (Brenner 2006; Busch 1976). 
Germany drove the process of European integration outflanking France, something which was 
pointed out already in the late 1960s by such scholars as Nicos Poulantzas and Christian Palloix 
in France, and Elmar Altvater in West Germany (Poulantzas 1974; Palloix 1975). Soon, 
however, problems appeared. How to reconcile the tension between "deepening" and 
"widening", ie, pushing for more capitalist integration in the direction of a (federal) United 
States of Europe, and enlarging in consecutive steps (from 6 countries in 1957 to 27 countries 
in 2010)? How could the pronounced developmental gap between the core and the periphery 
be bridged? With a customs union at hand since the Treaty of Rome, and prompted by the 
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monetary instability of the late 1960s, the Europeans pushed for monetary integration with 
the Werner Report of 1970. It came to naught due to American pressure, yet many in Europe 
at the time believed that Europe's economic space represented an "optimal currency area" -
- as Robert Mundell put it in a celebrated article in 1961 -- an ideal regional economy almost 
perfect for monetary integration (Mundell 1961). This indeed was the view that more or less 
dominated Europe's policy-making establishment until?? the breakout of the current crisis. 
Their concern has been to eliminate currency crises, exchange rate instability and risk. 
 This is the first fallacy, namely that uneven and deeply asymmetrical levels of 
economic development across Europe could be bridged by putting all currencies into the 
same hat and then, miraculously, levelling out uneven development and structural fault-lines 
by pulling the rabbit out of the hat -- the Euro, a currency lacking the political and fiscal 
support of a state. The second fallacy is called financialisation. From the 1980s onwards the 
dominant forces behind the processes of "deepening" and "widening" were other than 
Keynesian; they were deeply pro-monetarist, mercantilist forces: "Europe has been Hayek-
jacked". The emphasis, also because of pressure from Britain and the USA, was on "widening" 
rather than "deepening". Neo-liberalism and financialisation suited Germany very well, but 
one should not confuse the German model with the Anglo-Saxon one.  German banks do not 
operate in the same way as British or American banks (Lapavitsas 2013b). The Anglo-American 
model is driven by consumption and debt; the German by an anti-inflationary, export-led 
growth regime. These differences are very significant. From the Single European Act of 1986 
to the Maastricht Treaty of 1991, and from the Growth and Stability Pact of 1997 to the launch 
of the Euro in 1999 and after, the process of European integration has been subjected to a 
neo-mercantilist bias emanating from a relentless German strategy of export-led growth and 
wage suppression. The monetarist character of the Maastricht criteria was the result of this 
type of German discipline. From the mid-1990s onwards, and in order to increase profitability 
and price competitiveness, Germany put enormous downward pressure on wages 
(Stockhammer 2013) 
 Low wages, coupled with the institutional capacity of the German state and the 
dynamism of its real economic sector, magnified the existing gap between core and periphery. 
As we shall see, the introduction of EMU in 1999 exacerbated the asymmetries and monetary 
imbalances across Europe.  Thus, when the global financial crisis trickled down to the Euro-
zone via the banking sector -- German and European banks had bought 40% of American CDOs 
(Collateralised Debt Obligations) and other toxic assets -- the disintegrative tendencies of the 
EU multiplied overnight. Greece has been and remains the weak link in Europe's and the 
globe's financialisation chain. This is no accident.    
 
 
The Greek Debt Crisis 
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Greece has never been a solvent state. It always had a balance of payments problem (Fouskas 
& Dimoulas 2013; Freris 1986). From its foundation in 1830 to the present day the country 
has almost uninterruptedly been insolvent. Note that Greece became a state thirty and forty 
years ahead of Italy and Germany, respectively. But this was a geo-political accident, rather 
than a process of ethnic homogenisation led by a robust industrial bourgeoisie. Britain and 
France wanted to check, deter and even block Russia's position and expansion in the Eastern 
Mediterranean and Egypt's penetration of the Ottoman Empire through Crete and the 
Peloponnese (see map). Greece was perceived as having a significant strategic value for the 
West, a value that outstripped the country's real economic assets.  
 Even before the foundation of the Greek state, the Greek elites fighting the Ottomans 
had declared bankruptcy. They could not finance their struggle against the Turks. Greek elites 
mortgaged their future land as a collateralised debt obligation for the foreign loans received. 
The origins of debt were political and geo-strategic, rather than economic. 
 This is Greece's DNA: a dependent/subaltern state in the periphery of the imperial 
West that always lags behind the economically and technologically advanced capitalist core. 
Yet, because of its position on the map, the country has always had a significant geo-strategic 
value. This is the country's major fault-line which is challenging to map out. 
 I have argued earlier that the German model of growth differs from the Anglo-
American one. The former is based on a relentless pursuit of export-led growth and anti-
inflation bias, whereas the latter is based on consumption and debt-driven growth. These are 
the two major templates across the EU, although there are more complex cases, such as that 
of Italy, for example (Sassoon 1986; Fouskas 1998). Greece, potentially, offers a third 
template against which other periphery capitalisms within the Euro-zone and beyond might 
be measured.  
 I would endeavour calling this template subaltern financialisation. Countries of the 
periphery recycle the financial surpluses of the core, especially of Germany, increasing their 
indebtedness, all the while sustaining Germany's monetarist supremacy in EMU conditions 
and Germany's competitiveness vis-á-vis Asian and US capitals. Greece's economic and 
technological progress has always lagged behind the developed core, presenting a chronic 
balance of payments problem. This is a structural-historical problem. But one must also be 
able to identify the agency perspective here. If a country imports more than it exports, then 
the deficit country has an over-developed layer of the population, which are the big import 
consortia that some scholars, such as Andre Gunder Frank and Nicos Poulantzas, called 
comprador bourgeoisie (Poulantzas 1974; Frank 1972). Frank's case studies in the 1960s and 
1970s concerned Latin America, but my research indicates that this, mutatis mutandis, is also 
the case with Greece. The comprador element has been the dominant social class in Greece. 
During most parts of the 19th and 20th centuries, it overwhelmed a weak capitalist industrial 
sector and co-determined decision-making and corrupt practices at the state-bureacratic 
level. But this element was in cahoots not just with the Greek government, but also with 
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foreign powers and big business upon whom their welfare and comprador profits had been 
dependent. This is precisely what makes Greece a dependent/subaltern country in the global 
division of labour. But Greece has been a laggard also from a different perspective. During the 
"Golden Age of capitalism" in the 1950s and 1960s, the western societies experienced high 
wages, low inflation, almost full employment and sustained welfare and growth. Yet Greece 
saw nothing of this. The policy of its Central Bank was monetarist, supply-side economics 
prevailed and large sections of the population were excluded from political participation due 
to a crackdown on the Communist Left in the wake of the Civil War. When liberal democracy 
was restored in 1974 after seven years of dictatorship, the Right-wing government led by 
Constantine Karamanlis launched a Keynesian programme that clashed head on with the 
prevailing international trend of neo-liberal financialization. The same Keynesian policy of 
aggregate demand expansion was pursued by Karamanlis' socialist successor in the 1980s, 
Andreas Papandreou. Whereas everywhere in Europe and the West supply-side economics 
became the norm -- not even socialist France under Mitterrand could fight neo-liberalism as 
the failure of the Keynesian experiment of 1981-83 has shown -- Greece kept expanding its 
public sector augmenting its borrowing requirement.    
 One important source of the Greek debt today lies in the failure of Papandreou's 
cabinets to arrest the country's current account deficit by two consecutive devaluations of 
the drachma in the 1980s. Another is the massive domestic and external borrowing through 
which Greece's welfare state and nepotistic appointments in the public sector were financed 
(Fouskas 1997). It could be called "Keynesianism à la Greca". Greece enters the constellation 
of neo-liberal financialization in the mid-1990s, that is, at least 15 years later than most 
countries of the core, and after the collapse of Communism in its northern borders. Many at 
the time rushed to argue that Greece had lost its geo-strategic significance for the West and 
the country could plunge into debts and go bankrupt.  
 This prediction was wrong. Greece was very useful in the overall scheme of things, 
both for NATO's and the EU's processes of eastward enlargements. As Greece entered neo-
liberal financialisation in the second half of the 1990s under the neo-liberal "modernisation" 
agenda of Costas Simitis, PASOK Prime Minister from 1996 to 2004, it became a significant 
launching pad for the financialisation of the Balkans and the Near East, with its banks playing 
a major role in these two adjacent regions (Fouskas and Dimoulas 2013, 151 ff.). But was this 
Greek imperialism in the region? This is very doubtful. The Greek banking sector was and is 
completely dominated by foreign assets. More than 82% of the shares of "Greek" banks are 
owned by foreign individuals, insurance funds and other EU banks. Only 15% are owned by 
Greek interests (Union of Greek Banks 2011; Michalopoulos 2012). Therefore, the neo-liberal 
financialisation of Greece from the second half of the 1990s onwards served the work of core 
capitals and states of Europe, and above all served Germany's expansion agenda to Eastern 
Europe. This is what we can call subaltern financialisation and which is closely connected to 
geo-politics and international security. At the same time, the profile of the Greek comprador 
entrepreneur has changed: in the main, they now borrow heavily taking advantage of 
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favourable interest rate regimes in order not just to finance the import of real commodities 
but, importantly, to mediate in importing fictitious commodities. Greece's financialisation is 
completely subordinate to the speculative activity emanating from the core. Greece 
registered high growth rates in the early 2000s, but this growth was debt-driven, ie based on 
borrowing and consumption. Within the monetary Union, which it joined in 2001, Greece and 
other periphery countries became more and more uncompetitive in the face of Germany's 
economic engine. The current Euro-zone crisis is a balance of payments crisis, although in the 
case of Greece, we also need to factor in its fiscal problem.  
 We need to go a step further. The perceived geo-political and geo-strategic 
importance of Greece by NATO and the EU is reflected in the structure of the country's 
defence budget over the years. We need to single this out of the general political economy 
calculations, because it is directly connected to geo-politics and geo-strategy, as well as the 
perceived strategic value of the country for global imperial interests. 
 In 2009, defence expenditure in Greece was over 3,3% of GDP, as opposed to 2,4% for 
France, 2,7% for Britain, 2% for Portugal, 1,4% for Germany, 1,3 % for Spain and 4,7% for the 
USA. Between 2005 and 2009 the purchase of 26 F-16s from the USA and 25 Mirage-2000s 
from France represented 38% of the total import volume of the country (Tolios: 2011, 67-68; 
SIPRI: 2012). Greece bought all this hard gear not with cash, but with issuing of debt. In Greece 
there is no such thing as a military-industrial complex, but a comprador-military complex, 
hence the deeply subordinate position of the country in international political economy.  
 
Concluding Remarks 
We can now draw a few conclusions. 
I have argued that we can understand neither the financial crisis nor the Euro-zone crisis if we 
fail to embrace a historical perspective and bring in geo-politics and security as co-constitutive 
variables of the overall analysis. The stagflation of the 1970s and the closing of the "Gold 
window" by President Nixon, as Joanne Gowa put it (Gowa: 1983), is the key to understanding 
the unleashing of neo-liberal financialisation. This process has been driven by the great 
financial centres of New York and London and has transformed both the external and 
domestic environments of the capitalist state via boom and bust cycles, extreme financial 
engineering moving further away from the real economic sector. The dollarisation of the oil 
industry and massive improvement in defence technology, and technology and innovation, in 
general, are responsible for the defeat of Communism and the spread of what came to be 
called "globalisation". This template is based on consumption and a debt-driven growth. 
However, it has failed to restore profitability in the real economic sector and, significantly, it 
has failed to arrest the slow, complex and protracted decline of Western economies as a 
8 
 
whole, a decline that has been unfolding since the Vietnam War. Our world today is multi-
polar rather than unipolar.  
 Regionalisation may be seen as an answer to Anglo-American-led neo-liberal 
financialisation. Indeed, under the leadership of Germany, Europe has managed to achieve a 
customs union and a currency union and became ambitious about Eastward and Southward 
expansion. But the introduction of the EMU exacerbated the developmental gap between 
core and periphery, further sacrificing the industrial and agricultural capacity of the periphery 
on the altar of the success of Germany's model of neo-liberal financialisation. This is a neo-
mercantilist model of low inflation, low wages and high export growth, what I called the 
second template. The model was operational as long as Germany could recycle its trade and 
financial surpluses across the Euro-zone, increasing of course the debt of the periphery. This 
is a type of financial capital circuit and everything goes well as long as nasty crises are kept at 
bay. But German and European banks were exposed to Anglo-American financialisation. 
When the global financial crisis hit the German banks spreading the crisis to the periphery, 
the recycling of surpluses was interrupted and Germany began exporting to other periphery 
states not just cars, but also severe austerity. This is where we are at the moment. 
 Greece is simply a tiny little pawn in this gigantic historical picture. Her financialisation 
was completely subordinate to the interests of the core. But in the era of neo-liberal 
financialisation, its bargaining power can increase as a result of the crisis. When George 
Papandreou in October 2011 threatened to bring matters to a referendum, financial markets 
stalled. No one really knew exactly who held the mass quantities of Greek debt. At some 
point, Greece was on the front page of the Financial Times almost daily. For instance, if Greece 
had been pushed to an official default and exit from the Euro-zone, or if it had gone for a 
debtor-led default and exit in 2010-11, then pension funds in the United States holding Greek 
debt would have been unable to pay their pensioners, not to mention the possible knock-on 
effect that an official Greek default would have had on the European project, whatever that 
project is. Financial globalisation makes things very complicated. Today, of course, thanks to 
the official agreements that Greece's pre-Syriza cabinets have signed with the creditors, the 
bulk of the Greek debt is held by public institutions and banks. Under conditions of monetary 
union, this means that it falls on the Greek people to pay the debt for which it bears no 
substantial responsibility. Thus, the Left-wing Syriza party who rose to power in January 2015, 
is locked into the agreements made by the previous Centre-Right cabinets with the troika 
(IMF, ECB and the EU) and having no control of monetary policy, it is bound to accept the 
constraints imposed by Germany and the financial establishment that dominates the EU. Only 
an independent monetary policy and a new central bank issuing its own currency is in a 
position to create the necessary conditions for pro-Keynesian, pro-welfare policies in Greece. 
The same goes for the rest of European states, especially of the periphery.  
 As heterodox and post-Keynesian political economists have argued, the Greek and 
European crisis is not a fiscal crisis but rather and primarily a balance of payments crisis 
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caused by the recklessness of external and domestic elites. But we have moved beyond this 
thesis to look at the agency and geo-strategic dimensions of the crisis. We have called the 
domestic elites a comprador class which has not just repeatedly failed to catch up with the 
core, but also has led the country to its current malaise. Whether importing real commodities, 
e.g. German BMWs, or fictitious commodities, e.g. AIG insurance, these idiosyncratic elites 
do not serve the cause of economic development and growth, let alone catching-up with the 
Western core. German-imposed austerity on Greece and Europe is decimating the middle 
classes. This is especially pronounced in Greece where party politics has become polarised, 
even if this is asymmetrical and the political system founded after the fall of the Colonels in 
1974 is disintegrating. More than 4,000 people have committed suicide over the last four 
years; there are street clinics in operation and barter has become widespread; a couple of 
years ago, the University of Athens had suspended for a few months its operations due to lack 
of resources and administrative support personnel; the PASOK-ND government used to rule 
by decree and we do not know how the Syriza government, despite its good intentions, could 
rule any better if it keeps insisting on avoiding the most important debt, which is a debtor-led 
default and exit from the Euro-zone. The far-right, neo-Nazi Golden Dawn party, meanwhile, 
is making headway. One should wonder if the German Chancellor is proud of all this.  
 
 
CHECK REFERENCES FOR CONSISTENCY AND WHOLE ARTICLE  TO BE MADE CONSISTENT WITH 
HOUSE STYLE. 
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